Seminario de estadística educacional: (Un) Intended Consequences of a Teacher Performance Pay Program


Fecha: viernes 12 de julio de 2019

Horario: 14:00 a 15:00 hrs.

Lugar: Sala 5, Facultad de Matemáticas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.



 Relator:    Joniada Milla,Assistant Professor of Economics at Saint Mary’s University


I use a sharp regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the causal e ffect of a group
pay-for-performance program in the context of secondary education. The program is long-lived and
universal in nature. The program design ensures internal and external validity of the causal e ffects
estimated, which is rare in studies that rely on RDD. By combining four Chilean administrative
datasets into a unique longitudinal data, I am able to follow all of the teachers in the system
that were a ected directly by the program and four cohorts of their students. The longitudinal
nature of the data allows me to disentangle the underlying mechanisms of the program for both
teachers and students by analyzing separately the eff ect on incumbents and switchers before and
after each round of the pay-for-performance tournament. For teachers the outcomes of interest
are mobility and third-party teacher evaluations. For students I analyze standardized test scores
that are immune to “teaching to the test” practices. I find that the eff ect of the program on
school performance operates through both sorting and incentives. The results have direct policy

Keywords: RDD, Group Performance Pay, Impact mechanisms, Test scores.